Poland’s population decline worsened in 2025, but what's to blame?

Poland’s population is declining at a rate that currently seems less like a faraway concern and more like a civilizational warning for the near future.

The country saw 168,000 more deaths than births in 2025 — the 13th consecutive year that deaths outnumbered births — and its population dropped to about 37.33 million.

Key Takeaways:

• In 2025, Poland experienced 168,000 more deaths than births and experienced a .42% population decline, which was higher than the previous year.

• It is believed that low birth rates and people emigrating out of the country are the main contributors.

• Immigration is not an effective solution, as more families must have children in order to provide stability for the generations to come.

The Details:

Notes from Poland reports that "Preliminary data from Statistics Poland (GUS), a state agency, show that Poland’s population fell by 157,000 in 2025, reaching 37.33 million. That represented an annual decline of 0.42%, more than the decline of 0.39% recorded the previous year."

GUS articulated a bleak outlook, blaming these figures on two things.

“The low fertility rate, which has persisted for about three decades, will continue to contribute to low birth rates, especially in the context of the systematic decline in the number of women of reproductive age,” GUS penned. “This trend is further exacerbated by the persistently high level of emigration abroad.”

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Poland’s population could shrink even more than previously forecast, according to a new simulation by the state statistics agency that assumes current record-low birth rates will continue. The population would fall to 29.4m by 2060, down from 37.4m now notesfrompoland.com/2025/11/07/pol…

1:28 PM · Nov 7, 2025

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International Family News reported:

The age structure tells a grim story: 24.2% are now retirement-age (up from 22.2% in 2020 and 12.8% in 1990), while the working-age share dipped to 58.1% (from 59.4% in 2020). Children under 18 comprise only 17.7% (down from 18.4% in 2020 and 29% in 1990). The dependency ratio stands at 72 non-working per 100 working-age—mirroring 1990 but now skewed toward 42 retirees versus 30 youth, straining pensions, healthcare, and labor markets amid record employment driven by extended retiree work and female participation.

Notes from Poland also pointed out:

GUS notes that these demographic trends are changing not just the size but also the shape of Poland’s population.

In 2025, 24.2% of the population was above retirement age (defined as over 60 for women and 65 for men) up from 22.2% in 2020, 16.8% in 2010, and 12.8% in 1990.

Meanwhile, people of working age made up 58.1% of the population last year, down from 59.4% in 2020 and 64.4% in 2010.

The share of children has fallen sharply. People aged under 18 accounted for 17.7% of the population in 2025, compared with 18.4% in 2020, 18.8% in 2010, and 29% in 1990.

In 2025, Poland had 30 children and 42 retirees for every 100 people of working age, the outlet noted. In 1990, 50 were under working age, while only 22 were above it.

The shift means that today’s workforce is supporting more retirees and fewer children than three decades ago, adding pressure to pensions, healthcare and the labour market.

However, figures released last year by GUS showed that the number of workers in Poland has actually reached its highest ever level, thanks to more people remaining in work beyond retirement age and previously economically inactive adults, especially women, entering the labour market.

Although greater labor participation by older people and by women has temporarily increased the total number of workers to record levels, such a phenomenon hides a deeper structural problem: a society that is not replacing itself sufficiently and quickly enough. 

While immigration has helped mitigate some of Poland’s population decline, migration is not a long-term solution to counter the Central European country’s demographic issues. This is because an excessive reliance on migration instead of incentivizing Polish couples to get married and have children would result in a Poland that is older, more reliant on foreign workers, and less able to maintain social cohesion, welfare systems, and cultural institutions. 

Moreover, these figures show how fewer young adults lead to fewer marriages, fewer children, and an even smaller cohort able to form families in the next generation.

The Bottom Line:

For pro-life advocates who prize the dignity of every human life from conception, these figures are a grim reminder of what could happen when a culture places less emphasis on marriage and parenthood.

Changing Poland’s demographic situation necessitates more than policy tweaks, but would require efforts from the Church, state, and civil society, to prioritize family and parenthood.